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3Executive summary 
Online disinformation is deliberately false or misleading 
material, often masquerading as news content, which  
is designed to attract attention and exert influence 
through online channels. It may be produced to obtain 
advertising profit or for political purposes, and its spread 
is facilitated by social media and an anti-establishment 
current in European politics that creates a demand for 
alternative narratives. 
Its threat to democracy lies in its capacity to influence 
public opinion on the basis of falsehood. Operating 
mostly on independent websites outside the reach 
of traditional media’s regulatory framework, this 
type of content does not need to adhere to standards 
of accuracy or truthfulness. Instead, it preys on 
fear, insecurity, societal divisions, and ideological 
polarisation and gives its readers the satisfaction  
of reading something that confirms their worldview, 
regardless of the empirical truth behind the story.  
In doing so, it entrenches them in their views, driving 
them further towards the extremes.
Efforts to fight the spread of disinformation have had 
mixed results. Self-regulation by online platforms such 
as Twitter or Facebook puts a great deal of power in their 
hands, with potentially negative effects on independent 
news outlets that depend on social media for their 
outreach. State regulation, meanwhile, raises concerns of 
censorship. There is a danger that methods intended to 
reduce disinformation, implemented clumsily or without 
sufficient regard for their effects, will actually exacerbate 
the anti-establishment feeling that drives disinformation 
in the first place.
Just as the disinformation problem can, to a great extent, 
be traced back to wider structural faults in the political 
system, the solution, too, must be partly structural.  There 
must be a shift in commercial practices to disrupt the 
commercial motivations driving disinformation, make 
online platforms more fair, transparent and open, and 
reduce the pressure on media outlets to compete for 
attention. That means that all stakeholders carry a certain 
degree of responsibility in the fight against disinformation. 
Introduction
Online disinformation, or ‘fake news’, is more than just 
a distracting internet phenomenon. Its effects have 
profound consequences for democracy. By influencing 
public opinion on the basis of false information, it 
undermines voters’ abilities to make well-informed 
political choices. It can therefore be weaponised by 
subversive activists, feeding off widespread cynicism and 
partisan biases among citizens to support their political 
agenda. In fighting back, more traditional mainstream 
media and institutions of the ‘establishment’ such as 
the European Union (EU) risk inadvertently providing 
ammunition to hostile narratives eager to smear 
them with accusations of censorship or unfairness. 
Misleading or hyper-partisan news coverage is nothing 
new, nor is it something that only occurs online. But its 
proliferation across the internet is alarming. With social 
media becoming a large part of the lives of millions of 
Europeans, co-ordinated campaigns pushing misleading 
or partisan messages can influence public opinion on 
an unprecedented scale even with limited resources. 
Mainstream politics has to sit up and pay attention.
Some of these malicious efforts are the work of 
external actors such as the Russian state, engaged in an 
‘information war’ with the West. But many of them are 
home-grown.1 Domestic activists are also working to 
undermine fact-based political discourse, especially 
in support of populist, far-right or anti-democratic 
causes, and diminishing the influence of external actors 
is not enough in its own right. Winning this information 
war means winning on the home front too.
This paper will first explore what makes online 
disinformation dangerous, how it supports itself, and 
the motives that have encouraged its spread. It will then 
discuss and evaluate some of the recent efforts to fight 
back, as implemented by national governments, EU 
bodies, and social media platforms. In doing so, it will 
identify other potential resources in the private sector. 
Finally, a set of recommendations will follow for each 
of these actors in turn, with the aim of providing some 
proposals for a society-wide collaborative approach.
‘Fake news’ and ‘disinformation’ > The term ‘fake news’ may 
be widely recognised in public debate, but academic and 
policy sources generally advise against it, recommending 
‘disinformation’ instead.2 While misinformation refers 
to material that is simply erroneous, for example due to 
error or ignorance, disinformation implies an intentional, 
malicious attempt to mislead – see Fig. 1 on page 5.  
In this paper, ’fake news’ and ‘disinformation’ are used  
as synonyms. 
 
Disinformation is just one of several tools that exploit 
social media and internet technology to the detriment 
of the democratic political system. This paper will not 
attempt to cover targeted advertising, automated  
accounts (‘bots’), or hacking and ‘meddling’ in election 
campaigns. These may be used to increase the reach of 
disinformation, and may be facilitated by some of the  
same factors described here, but they are distinct 
techniques in their own right and are not core to the 
subject of this paper.
41. A threat to democracy?
Only a few years ago, the internet was widely seen as 
a force for good in supporting democracy. The Occupy 
movement and the Arab Spring – which became known 
as the ‘Facebook Revolution’ – were hailed at the time 
for demonstrating social media’s power to give ordinary 
citizens a voice and even effect real change.
But a number of high-profile political events in the past 
few years have shaken our confidence in the internet’s 
democratic potential. Starting with the double blows of 
the decision of the British electorate to leave the European 
Union in the ‘Brexit’ referendum and the election of 
Donald Trump as President of the United States, followed 
by elections in several European countries where radical 
illiberal parties put in strong showings, ‘fake news’ has 
become a matter of acute political concern for the role 
it may have played in influencing these outcomes. It is 
difficult to prove whether or not disinformation had a 
decisive impact, but there is no doubt that it had a wide 
reach: an analysis by BuzzFeed found that fabricated news 
stories reached a greater online audience than ‘real’ 
news in the final months of the US election campaign.3
In any case, disinformation has raised concerns among 
internet watchdogs, academics and the general public. 
A 2017 report on internet freedom by Freedom House 
concluded that “online manipulation and disinformation 
tactics played an important role in elections in at least 
18 countries over the past year… [contributing] to a 
seventh consecutive year of overall decline in internet 
freedom”.4 A Eurobarometer survey in February 2018 
found that 83% of European citizens believe that fake 
news represents “a danger to democracy”.5
The appeal of disinformation for illiberal 
politicians is that it is a convenient tool  
for extremist discourse to compete 
with and ultimately crowd out rational, 
informed debate.
This is unsurprising, given the prominence of 
disinformation in recent election campaigns across  
Europe. In a TV debate prior to the French presidential 
elections, the far-right candidate Marine Le Pen raised 
accusations that her liberal opponent, Emmanuel Macron, 
had a secret bank account in the Caribbean, referring to a 
malicious story that had begun circulating on Twitter only 
a few hours beforehand.6 In Germany, a claim that Angela 
Merkel had taken a selfie with one of the men involved 
in a terror attack in Brussels reached twice as many 
Facebook users as the factual account issued to correct the 
rumour.7 The Czech presidential election in January 2018 
was marked by an abundance of false articles smearing 
liberal candidate Jiři Drahoš as a paedophile or communist 
collaborator, claiming that he was ‘pro-immigrant’ despite 
his opposition to migrant quotas.8 In each case, the 
disputed stories reflected poorly on ‘establishment’ 
candidates and favoured the narrative of illiberal or 
populist actors.
The appeal of disinformation for illiberal politicians is 
that it is a convenient tool for extremist discourse to 
compete with and ultimately crowd out rational, 
informed debate. In a media environment where revenue 
depends to a great extent on the number of clicks an 
article can generate, there is demand for ever more 
dramatic or sensational headlines as news outlets compete 
for readers. Content that triggers a strong emotional 
response is prioritised over sensible, fact-based reporting. 
In this way, the low standards set by fake news cross 
over into mainstream journalism as well, with negative 
consequences for the public debate all around. 
When it requires too much effort or 
expertise to tell the difference between 
fact and fiction, a common response is to 
turn away from politics altogether. Such 
disillusioned citizens may even come to 
lose faith in democracy itself.
It can also contribute to political apathy by sowing doubt 
and confusion to such an extent that citizens, overwhelmed 
and unable to say for sure what is really true, simply 
retreat from politics. This is what the RAND Corporation 
has described as the “firehose of falsehood” technique, 
used to great effect in Putin’s Russia and now being 
exported to serve Russia’s interests abroad: a “challenge to 
the very notion of an independent accounting of facts”, in 
which all news becomes perceived as potentially fake, and 
politics too complicated to be worth following.9 When it 
requires too much effort or expertise to tell the difference 
between fact and fiction, a common response is to turn 
away from politics altogether. Such disillusioned citizens 
may even come to lose faith in democracy itself.
So disinformation aims to undermine the very notion 
that there can be such a thing as a reliable fact, which is 
the basis of any healthy democracy. Democracy is about 
making choices: this requires a well-informed debate. The 
idea of ‘truth’ is needed to hold politicians accountable. 
These roles – keeping the populace informed and holding 
power to account – are among those traditionally played 
by the media, and the internet is perhaps the most 
important part of the media today. The proliferation of 
unreliable information on the internet is therefore 
a challenge to one of the structural pillars of 
democracy. This means disinformation is more than just 
a moral problem; it is actively undemocratic. It follows 
that democratic societies should be concerned enough 
about its effects to take action against it.
52. The business model of falsehood
The European Commission’s definition of  
disinformation — “all forms of false, inaccurate, or 
misleading information designed, presented and 
promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for 
profit”10 — captures the two main motives that drive 
its creation and distribution. First, the commercial 
motive: to obtain advertising revenue or market share, 
typically by attracting readers with sensational claims. 
Second, the political motive: to shape public opinion 
according to particular interests. Both present a political 
problem, and the line between the two is often blurred, 
especially when profit-driven disinformation becomes 
’useful’ to political actors.
These motives are facilitated by two factors that have 
worked to increase disinformation’s reach in recent 
years. First, advances in technology, particularly social 
media, have had a transformative effect on the media 
environment. In particular, it has massively increased the 
reach of information that can originate anywhere, not 
just from professional newsrooms or ‘trusted’ sources. 
Second, the increase in support for anti-establishment, 
anti-EU political actors over recent years would suggest 
that there is an increased demand for information that 
supports ‘alternative’ discourses. The following section 
will explore these factors in more depth.
2.1  THE NEW TOOLS
Tabloid journalism (exemplified by newspapers such as 
Bild in Germany or The Sun in the UK) has been making 
money from sensationalism for years. Sensationalist 
coverage is not necessarily fake news, but in the absence 
of regulation or scrutiny the distinction between them 
can easily become blurred, especially for online-only 
outlets with no paper edition. Meanwhile, the shift 
in consumption habits in the internet age has 
had serious repercussions on public exposure to 
‘unscrupulous’ journalism. The original tabloids existed 
in a public sphere where their stories could be challenged 
by other newspapers on the rack; today, it is more and 
more likely that readers will never be exposed to other 
takes at all. 
Where once there was a single public space 
dominated by competitive media, there 
is now a multiplicity of individualised 
information spheres.
For those who get the majority of their information from 
social media (more than half the population in most 
European countries11), the ‘echo chamber’ effect may 
severely restrict the type of news content they see. Most 
social media platforms work by presenting users with 
content similar to that they have already liked, with the 
result that they are only shown a narrow selection of 
views. Where once there was a single public space 
dominated by competitive media, there is now a 
multiplicity of individualised information spheres.
What is more, the commercial structure of online 
journalism encourages sensationalism. Online advertising 
prioritises page views above all else: a webpage that 
receives a large number of clicks is more profitable 
than one with a more restricted audience, regardless 
of what appears on the page. This has changed the way 
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6that online news sources present their content — witness 
the shift towards ‘clickbait’ headlines that perform well 
on social media (see box) and the increased prominence 
of features that encourage readers to ‘share’ the article 
and contribute to its wider dissemination. But for those 
with fewer scruples or with no reputation to protect, 
advertising is an easy way to make money, provided you 
have a knack for writing attractive headlines.
Clickbait > Headlines that, instead of summarising the 
topic of the article, provide a teasing and often emotionally 
manipulative preview designed to pique the reader’s 
curiosity and encourage them to read something they might 
otherwise skip. Common examples use phrases like “You 
won’t believe what happened next”, “This simple trick…”, or 
“Top 10 most unbelievable facts (Number 9 will shock you)”. 
The articles themselves are often low-effort material with 
little original content: the aim is merely to attract the click. 
However, so-called ‘respectable’ news outlets, such as the 
BBC, have also adopted ‘clickbait’-style headlines in an effort 
to attract younger readers who are used to less traditional 
news sources.12
These clickbaiting techniques often blur the lines 
between news and entertainment, fitting into a social 
media environment where there is no distinction between 
updates posted by friends, amusing material, and serious 
news. While a newspaper may divide its content between 
reporting, opinion, and a human interest section, the 
social media newsfeed puts everything together. The 
only important thing is that each piece of content, be 
it a friend’s holiday photos, a funny video, or a serious 
news article, invokes an emotional response. The 
most successful ‘fake news’ works eliciting the desired 
emotional response from a certain group of people – and 
outrage, fear or envy are generally easier to evoke than 
more positive emotions.
While a newspaper may divide its  
content between reporting, opinion, and  
a human interest section, the social media 
newsfeed puts everything together.  
The only important thing is that each piece 
of content, be it a friend’s holiday photos, 
a funny video, or a serious news article, 
invokes an emotional response. 
‘Fake news’ online seems to have its origin in satirical 
news sites, with some authors originally writing parody 
material before finding that hoax articles were more 
likely to go viral and bring in ad revenue. According to a 
report by BuzzFeed, most fake news stories in the first 
half of 2016 were about crime or medical anomalies, often 
aiming to shock or amuse; it was only in the second half 
of the year that the US presidential election revealed the 
fertile market for misleading political articles.13 In other 
words, even much politically-themed disinformation 
is motivated not by politics so much as by money.
As a striking example, many of the 2016 US election’s 
most-read fake news stories were not produced in 
America at all, but by students in the Macedonian town 
of Veles.14 Dozens of tech-savvy teenagers registered 
websites with names such as USA Daily News and 
USConservativeToday.com to take advantage of the huge 
audience for articles claiming, for example, that Pope 
Francis had endorsed Donald Trump for President, or that 
Hilary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS. The hosts of these 
websites had no stake in the election and no political 
motives: they were motivated purely by the thousands of 
euros they could earn from stuffing their webpages with 
advertising and sharing them within partisan Facebook 
groups. Reporters who covered the Veles ‘fake news boom’ 
found that some of these teens were earning thousands of 
euros every day during the height of demand in 2016. 
Where there is an eager audience and a 
monetary award, a parasitical fake news 
industry is virtually inevitable.  
In a country where the average income is €350 a month, the 
appeal of running a fake news ‘business’ is clear. But there 
are writers making money from disinformation in the US 
and EU too. One fake news entrepreneur, running a network 
of sites and commissioning writers from all over the world, 
implied he was making up to $30,000 a month, proving how 
profitable disinformation can be.15 In an age of precarious 
work and high youth unemployment, disinformation is an 
attractive endeavour for technically literally young people. 
If European politics has not yet been the target of a cottage 
industry on this scale, it is probably only because of the 
smaller potential audience for articles in languages other 
than English. Where there is an eager audience and a 
monetary award, a parasitical fake news industry is 
virtually inevitable. The Veles example proves that, with 
the tools provided by social media, disinformation can 
be a profitable endeavour for anyone, not just organised 
newsrooms or state propaganda departments.
What is more, this kind of material can be written and 
published anonymously, meaning its creators are in no 
way accountable. In the case of ‘traditional’ journalism, 
it is at least always clear who wrote the article, who edited 
it, and who approved its publication. Such accountability 
is missing in the case of online self-publishing. Factor in 
unprincipled actors with a political message to push, and 
the result is a chronic stream of harmful disinformation.
But the possibilities provided by social media and 
advertising revenue are only part of the story. The ease 
with which disinformation can be made and spread does 
not in itself explain why the majority of disinformation is 
directed against the established political order, or why it 
finds such a receptive audience in the first place. 
72.2  THE NEW DEMAND
Many of the Veles teenagers’ fake articles were somewhat 
implausible stories designed more to attract attention 
than to actually convince. But in the hands of actors with 
political motives, their techniques can be used for more 
insidious purposes. The activity in Veles attracted the 
attention of American conservative activists who 
wanted to see Donald Trump in the White House, and 
there is evidence to suggest that, as polling day neared, 
they worked more and more closely together.16 What had 
begun as a money-making exercise became a tool for 
unscrupulous political activism.
Similarly, ‘alternative’ media outlets, such as Sputnik  
News or Breitbart (see box), feed a very real demand 
for anti-establishment news content. But at the same 
time they may also seek to use this anti-establishment 
sentiment to shift public opinion in Europe according 
to the interests of a political actor: in the case of 
Sputnik, the Russian state; for Breitbart, the international 
‘alt-right’. When this motivation to feed a particular 
ideology eclipses the commitment to accurate information, 
the result is disinformation.
Sputnik, Breitbart > These are some of the biggest 
‘alternative’ online news outlets. Not all the stories they 
publish are ‘fake news’, but they are heavily partisan and 
prioritise sensationalist headlines over accurate information. 
Sputnik is owned by the Russian government and aims to 
promote Russian interests abroad, much like RT (formerly 
Russia Today), which mainly operates as a television 
channel. Breitbart, meanwhile, is an American outlet 
associated with the ‘alt-right’. Its former editor, Steve Bannon, 
served as an advisor to Donald Trump and is now working to 
establish a foundation in Brussels to support the European 
far-right. Countering the mainstream media with ‘alternative’ 
messaging is a central part of his political strategy.
Frustration with mainstream news, caused by the 
perception that it is partisan or unfair to a particular 
cause, is a ripe source of opportunity for news outlets 
with less commitment to factual objectivity. Many of 
these outlets enthusiastically take up causes that are 
divisive or controversial in Europe, especially those with 
potential to threaten the stability of the EU, such as Brexit 
or the crisis in Catalonia. In many cases, they do so quite 
openly, touting their ‘alternative’ credentials as a means 
to draw in viewers who feel their political views are not 
treated fairly by other outlets. RT (formerly known as 
Russia Today), for example, makes no attempt to hide its 
links to the Russian government, and its business model 
depends on the idea that it offers an “alternative view of 
global events”. RT claims that, although its broadcasting 
may be biased, so is that of Western channels such as 
the BBC or CNN (which, in reality, are independent and 
not subject to a state-defined editorial line like RT). Its 
slogan is “Question More” – implying that, by watching 
RT, viewers will learn to perceive biases in other outlets 
(and thereby distrust them). The fact that RT continues 
to attract an audience (43 million viewers in 15 European 
countries17) at least partly because it is perceived as being 
“honest about lying”18 – unlike other, supposedly equally 
biased outlets – demonstrates that there is an existing 
undercurrent of dissatisfaction with mainstream 
news that is open for exploitation.
To an extent, this frustration may be caused by external 
factors beyond the media’s control. The proliferation 
of online news sources has exposed the public to a 
greater variety of views, making them more demanding 
of appropriate balance in the traditional media. But 
the media’s response to the changing environment 
has not always been to prioritise dependability and 
credibility. Faced with competition from sensationalist 
‘clickbait’ headlines online, standards have been slipping 
for many news organisations anxious to maintain their 
readership. An editorial line is one thing, but one-sided 
Some dedicated fake 
news websites are 
obvious fakes, such as 
USConservativeToday.com 
(left). But some are more 
cleverly put together. 
During the 2017 French 
presidential election, a 
page-for-page copy of 
Le Soir appeared under 
the URL lesoir.info (right) 
– it contained a single 
false story about the 
funding behind Macron’s 
campaign, and was widely 
shared on social media.
8coverage frustrates readers who are able to see, via social 
media or other channels, that there is clearly another 
side to the story. In some cases, by being excessively 
partisan themselves, mainstream news sources have 
contributed to a situation where partisan loyalty has 
undermined objectivity.
Not all fake news stories are necessarily anti-establishment 
in nature or viable to be used by populist or extremist 
politicians to support their own narratives. But the 
topics that dependably elicit a strong response are 
often those where populist discourse has already 
established a strong presence, such as immigration, 
terrorism and allegations of corruption or misconduct 
by mainstream politicians. This in itself reveals that the 
spread of disinformation stems from a lack of trust in the 
‘mainstream’, represented by the media and government 
parties, and as political polarisation increases, so does 
demand for appropriately partisan news content.
In some cases, by being excessively partisan 
themselves, mainstream news sources have 
contributed to a situation where partisan 
loyalty has undermined objectivity.
Disinformation’s success therefore owes a great 
deal to the prevailing political mood, particularly 
the increasing support for populist parties. What 
is more, the techniques of social media content play 
into their hands. Populists have carved out a niche in 
the political spectrum through provocative discourse 
and attempting to monopolise the debate on a handful 
of issues; a media environment where sensationalism 
trumps measured discourse provides the perfect storm 
to push their messages. It also plays into the hands 
of those who seek to promote an ‘us versus them’ 
narrative, entrenching polarisation. Meanwhile, the 
fact that most disinformation is directed against the 
‘established’ political order means that, in spreading 
its message and pushing people towards more 
extreme political opinions, it also creates a more 
favourable environment for itself. Dissatisfaction 
with mainstream politics, polarisation, populist political 
actors and disinformation are all linked to one another 
and mutually reinforcing, creating a vicious cycle that is 
difficult to break.
This has made disinformation a favoured technique of 
extremist activists, sometimes coordinating their efforts 
in chat rooms or messaging apps to ensure that their 
content reaches as wide an audience as possible. Such 
organised campaigning is carried out almost exclusively 
in support of illiberal parties like the AfD in Germany19 
and the Front National (now Rassemblement National) 
in France, and while it may not be part of these parties’ 
official campaigns or sanctioned by their leaders, the  
aim is to upset the established order and shift the 
narrative in their favour. As with Le Pen’s comment 
about Macron’s supposed Caribbean bank account 
(see section 1.1), populist leaders have demonstrated  
that they are perfectly willing to make use of this  
underground, unofficial support and spread 
disinformation more widely, giving it a gloss of  
legitimacy for their less extreme followers.
Dissatisfaction with mainstream politics, 
polarisation, populist political actors 
and disinformation are all linked to one 
another and mutually reinforcing, creating 
a vicious cycle that is difficult to break.
In many cases, this organised activism is supported or 
abetted by other actors with an interest in weakening 
the European liberal democratic system. Notably, the 
Russian state has provided support to AfD activists 
and worked to spread subversive messaging all over 
Europe.20 This is a serious threat, but it should be put 
into perspective. A great deal of Russian online activity 
in Europe and the US consists of amplifying existing 
divisions. Concern over the role played by the Russian 
state in influencing Western elections often obscures the 
fact that this ‘meddling’ consists of political messaging 
that is eagerly accepted by parts of the electorate. Russian 
meddling is not mind control; if their ads or fake articles 
are successful in shifting European or American public 
opinion, which is a domestic problem as much as it is 
a state security issue.
Disinformation is not merely a cause of political 
polarisation, populist support, and anti-establishment 
feeling; it is also a symptom of a political system that 
already finds itself on shaky ground. Motivated by profit 
and political interest, and facilitated by social media and 
an eager audience, disinformation is likely to continue 
to be a prominent issue until this underlying problem is 
addressed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to venture 
solutions to this disillusionment with liberal democratic 
‘mainstream’ politics, but it must be borne in mind that 
any efforts to counter disinformation will ultimately only 
be successful if there is at least as much effort directed to 
fixing the fundamental causes.
Nevertheless, there are certain things that can be done 
to stem the flow of disinformation. The following section 
will explore some of the efforts that have been made to 
resist disinformation, the challenges those efforts have 
faced, and the risks these kinds of approaches entail.
Disinformation is not merely a cause of 
political polarisation, populist support, 
and anti-establishment feeling; it is also a 
symptom of a political system that already 
finds itself on shaky ground. 
93. Existing measures and their challenges
To a great extent, the debate so far about how to resist 
disinformation has focused on policing content on social 
media platforms. There are typically two approaches to 
this task: self-regulation by the platforms themselves, and 
governmental regulation, which may take place at the 
level of national governments or at the EU level. This section 
will analyse both in turn, before going on to consider the 
efforts of private sector actors which have largely been  
side-lined in the public debate so far. For each actor, it 
will also consider the risks or disadvantages of existing 
measures, with an eye to ascertaining more promising areas 
to direct future efforts. Finally, it will consider the principles 
and strategies behind the EU’s efforts.
3.1   ONLINE PLATFORMS AND SELF-REGULATION
Once seen as the most obvious route to a healthy 
online space, self-regulation – that is, the efforts of 
social media companies to police their own content 
and fight against the spread of disinformation on 
their services – is now widely seen as ineffective or 
insufficient.21 The public mood has turned against 
the platforms, which are often perceived as not 
taking the problem seriously enough. When Mark 
Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, initially dismissed claims 
that activity on the platform could have influenced 
the outcome of the US presidential election, calling it 
“a pretty crazy idea”, he received a lot of criticism for 
being complacent.22 Meanwhile, multiple scandals have 
further reduced public trust in social media, such as 
the March 2018 revelations that political consultancy 
Cambridge Analytica had made use of the data of up to 
87 million Facebook users, acquired without permission. 
Facebook’s appearances in parliamentary hearings did 
little to reassure policymakers and the public in the US 
and in Europe that it was doing enough, and later leaks 
revealing its business practices, including hiring a firm 
to investigate the financial interests of George Soros, 
a prominent critic, have been disastrous PR for the 
company. In this climate, it is little surprise that  
social media companies find themselves under  
intense scrutiny.
However, the platforms’ continued efforts to improve 
their systems and their moderation efficiency should 
be recognised. In the last few years, social media 
companies, particularly the ‘big three’ of Facebook, 
Google and Twitter, have become aware of their roles 
in facilitating online disinformation and are willing to 
cooperate in combating it, not least for the sake of their 
own reputations. Where once they saw themselves as 
simply vehicles for user-generated content, with little 
responsibility for what is posted by users, the social 
media giants are now becoming more sensitive to 
their unparalleled public roles and the corporate and 
social responsibility they require. Accordingly, they 
have increased their self-regulation efforts, such as by 
hiring more moderators and experimenting with changes 
to their algorithms. 
Social media platform > In the context of social media, 
a ‘platform’ is the application or interface where users 
interact with content and with each other. Social media 
platforms can take a variety of formats, but this paper is 
concerned chiefly with networks that link users with public 
content on a text-based ‘newsfeed’, such as Facebook 
or Twitter. Disinformation can also spread on platforms 
dedicated to sharing video or image content (e.g. YouTube, 
Instagram) or private messaging apps (e.g. WhatsApp, 
Snapchat), but these are outside the scope of this paper.
Algorithm > Most social media platforms choose which 
content to display to users by means of a formula which 
takes into account what the platform knows – or can 
learn – about the user to suggest content he or she may 
find interesting. This is the same technology that provides 
suggestions and similar items on retail websites, and has a 
similar purpose: to maximise user engagement with  
the site, potentially leading to more income, in this case 
via advertising. For this reason, a platform’s algorithm 
is often the key to its success and a cornerstone of its 
business model.
Where once they saw themselves as simply 
vehicles for user-generated content, with 
little responsibility for what is posted 
by users, the social media giants are 
now becoming more sensitive to their 
unparalleled public roles and the corporate 
and social responsibility they require. 
Any future anti-disinformation strategy must surely 
include rigorous self-policing as part of its general 
approach. But self-regulation has not always been 
successful, and it carries many pitfalls. 
There are simple problems facing the most obvious 
anti-disinformation measures. Users can flag or report 
suspicious content, but there is no way of preventing 
users from abusing this in an attempt to have genuine 
content taken down, for example if they disagree with 
it politically. Fact-checking services can work full time 
to debunk fake stories, but it is impossible to guarantee 
that a ‘debunking’ article will reach the same users as 
the original inaccurate story. What is more, the time and 
effort required to discredit a false story is excessive in 
comparison to the effort required to make something up 
in the first place: in the time it takes to disprove one false 
article, several others may have appeared in its place.
With more than two billion active users, Facebook is 
the largest social media platform by some distance, 
so it makes sense to explore some of its measures in 
more detail. From partnering with fact-checkers to flag 
disputed information, through polling its users about 
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which news sources they trust, to changing its news feed 
algorithm to prioritise content posted by friends over that 
posted by interest groups, the disinformation scare has 
led Facebook to experiment with the very way it presents 
its content. But some of its efforts have backfired or had 
other unintended consequences. 
The time and effort required to discredit 
a false story is excessive in comparison to 
the effort required to make something up 
in the first place: in the time it takes to 
disprove one false article, several others 
may have appeared in its place.
Facebook’s tweaking of their newsfeed algorithm has, 
in some cases, had disastrous effects for the reach of 
‘independent’ news outlets (that is, alternatives to 
government- or business-owned mass media), particularly 
in countries where these strongly depend on social  
media. An experiment carried out on their Slovakian 
users, for example, whereby all publisher-posted content 
was moved from the default view to a separate feed, 
resulted in a 400% drop in user interactions (i.e. likes, 
comments, shares, and clicks) overnight for major 
Slovakian news sites.23 
Changing the algorithms to reduce the importance of 
news articles equates to throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater: it reduces the disinformation problem, 
but at the cost of also reducing the reach of ‘real’ 
news. This does nothing to improve the standards of 
information available to users, but rather diminishes 
social media’s huge potential for the news media 
landscape. What is more, Facebook’s technique of 
trialling new features only in certain markets means 
that the browsing experience can vary significantly 
between countries, making it difficult to know if we are 
all seeing the same thing when we log on. As a result, 
different countries’ experiences in fighting disinformation 
on the platform are not necessarily comparable.
Like many other platforms, Facebook is constantly 
compiling data about its users’ habits and using 
this information to improve its user experience and 
business model. But the company’s analysis and 
research findings are not made public. For example, 
Facebook once experimented with a system of flagging 
disputed news stories, but withdrew the feature after 
its analysis suggested this was causing more harm 
than good, entrenching people in their beliefs rather 
than encouraging them to seek out more reliable 
information.24 This seems to be a finding with important 
implications, and would be of great interest not only to 
anti-disinformation campaigners but also to political 
scientists, psychologists, and many other researchers. But 
many online platforms, including Facebook, consider 
their algorithms and research data to be business 
secrets and do not allow researchers to access this 
potential goldmine of information for fear of losing 
their competitive edge. The result is that each platform 
is fighting its own battle against disinformation and not 
sharing findings with other stakeholders.
In any case, Facebook’s headline-grabbing initiatives in 
this field are partly a result of its extraordinary position  
in the online sector. Its enormous resources and  
market-dominant position mean that it is able to 
implement potentially loss-making changes that are 
out of the reach of smaller, less affluent companies. 
In the last two years, Facebook has changed its business 
model to start prioritising the quality of user experience 
over the quantity, aiming to reduce time spent on the 
platform – a luxury not available to all online media, most 
of which are engaged in a frantic competition for user 
attention and clicks. The fact that Facebook’s changes are 
so far the most significant concrete measures taken against 
disinformation is itself revealing of the extent to which we 
rely on the algorithms of a few monopolistic services.
This domination of the online space by a handful of 
commercial actors raises concerns relating to the freedom 
of information. Entrusting social media platforms with 
the ability to decide what information is shown to  
their users carries the risk of the ‘privatisation of 
censorship’ – arguably worse than state censorship, 
which can at least be challenged politically. Facebook 
does not seek to remove false material from the platform 
entirely, claiming that to do so would be “contrary to 
the basic principles of free speech” and that fabricated 
information does not necessarily violate its terms of use 
or community standards.25 Instead, it merely aims to 
‘demote’ suspicious content so that it is less prominent 
on the newsfeed and its reach is restricted (see image). 
But this principle does not hold water: whether material 
is removed completely or merely prevented from 
reaching the audience it would otherwise reach, the 
result is still censorship. By stopping short of removing 
suspicious content outright, Facebook avoids having 
to define what it considers to be fake news. It thereby 
also avoids having to process appeals: users will never 
know for certain if their content is being ‘demoted’. The 
platform is therefore able to exercise blanket censorship 
on anything that could potentially be harmful, without 
needing to justify its individual choices.
Whether material is removed completely 
or merely prevented from reaching  
the audience it would otherwise reach,  
the result is still censorship. 
This is one of the concerns that has led to distrust of self-
regulation, and part of the reason why state regulation 
has become more attractive to policymakers. However, 
self-regulation and state regulation do not exist in 
isolation from one another. Stuck between the hammer 
of public scrutiny and the anvil of private censorship, 
social media platforms have a difficult enough job even 
without political activists seeking to game their systems. 
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As governments increase the pressure, the platforms 
often err on the side of caution by adopting stricter 
standards than they otherwise would in order to avoid 
fines. As the following section will demonstrate, state 
regulation carries no fewer dangers.
3.2   THE GOVERNMENTS OF EU MEMBER STATES
As disinformation has become a matter of public concern, 
EU member states have taken a variety of approaches to 
legislate against it. In Italy, for example, the government 
set up a website allowing people to report false stories to 
the police. In Ireland, a bill was proposed to criminalise 
the use of bots (automated social media accounts) to 
spread disinformation, while Denmark and Sweden have 
taken steps to include disinformation in their existing 
media literacy campaigns.26 But the most noteworthy 
efforts to legislate against disinformation have come in 
the form of two laws in the biggest member states, France 
and Germany.
In Germany, attempts to fight disinformation largely 
consist of expanding existing legislation targeting hate 
speech and other illegal material to include ‘fake news’. 
In France, meanwhile, new legislation has been tabled 
specifically to address disinformation. Both approaches 
run into the problem of how to define disinformation 
legally, and carry the risk that it may end up being the 
politicians who decide rather than the courts.
The German approach bundles disinformation into a 
new hate speech law (it entered into force in April 2018) 
that allows for fines of up to €50 million for social 
media platforms that fail to remove hate speech and 
illegal material within 24 hours.27 The French law 
focuses on transparency, requiring social media to reveal 
the sources of news content and advertising, but it also 
allows for sites that host fake news stories to be shut 
down following a judicial procedure. Specifically, during 
election campaigns candidates can sue for the removal 
of contested news stories, requiring courts to rule on 
whether the reports are credible. 
Both laws run into problems of time. The 24-hour limit 
of the German law is enormously ambitious, given that a 
report in 2017 found that Facebook managed to remove 
reported content within that time limit in just 40% of 
cases. For comparatively understaffed Twitter, it was 
only 1%. Even then, 24 hours is still a long time, given 
that social media content can go viral in minutes. 
The French law’s focus on election periods, presumably 
drawing from the experience of the 2017 presidential 
elections (when Emmanuel Macron’s campaign was a 
target of disinformation), neglects that political opinions 
and voting intentions are not formed solely during 
election campaigns, and scrutiny must continue to be 
applied even when the stakes are perceived to be  
lower. Applying different standards during election 
periods is political ammunition for opposition activists  
to cry censorship.
To date, these laws have hardly been used, perhaps 
demonstrating that they are unwieldy and ineffective in 
practice. Critics have suggested that their real power 
lies in their chilling effect: even if the regulations 
themselves stop short of censorship, it is likely that 
the platforms themselves may be overzealous in their 
implementation of the rules, blocking more content than 
is strictly necessary in an effort to avoid fines and bad 
publicity. Especially when under time pressure (as with 
the German 24-hour rule), it is safer for the platforms to 
err on the side of caution than to risk enormous fines. In 
other words, the distinction between state regulation 
and self-regulation is not always so clear-cut, and  
self-censorship may be the result even when measures 
stop short of state censorship.
It is no surprise that member states with tough existing 
laws regarding hate speech, such as Germany, have been 
the readiest to legislate against disinformation, while 
countries with proudly liberal free speech traditions, 
such as the Netherlands, have sought to defend these 
traditions (see section 3.4 for more information on how 
the debate has unfolded in the Netherlands). Effectively, 
this is a new chapter in the long struggle between free 
speech and censorship. A common thread in that story 
has always been the actions of political actors, including 
governments, who deliberately make use of censorship 
to suit their own interests. Fighting disinformation 
is an excellent excuse for governments of a more 
authoritarian nature to implement crackdowns on 
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media freedom more widely, or to allow disinformation 
of their own to circulate while suppressing independent 
media. According to Péter Krekó of the Political Capital 
Institute in Budapest, the Hungarian media landscape 
today features very few underground ‘fake news’ outlets 
precisely because the mainstream media, largely in 
government hands, produces fabricated material in the 
same vein, while opposition media is shut down.29 In 
the Czech Republic, President Milos Zeman bypasses 
the mainstream press in favour of ‘alternative’ media 
websites, lending them legitimacy.30
Even if the regulations themselves stop 
short of censorship, it is likely that the 
platforms themselves may be overzealous 
in their implementation of the rules, 
blocking more content than is strictly 
necessary in an effort to avoid fines and 
bad publicity.
In fact, governments in general are the wrong agents 
for effectively fighting disinformation. State regulation 
can be just as counter-productive as self-regulation, 
with the additional danger that it risks encouraging 
the very anti-establishment feeling it seeks to counter. 
Fortunately, there is a third option. Structural resistance 
to disinformation can be built up through the efforts 
of civil society, NGOs, and the private sector, as will be 
described in the following section. 
3.3   THE ANTI-DISINFORMATION  
SERVICE INDUSTRY
NGOs have a strong interest in fighting disinformation, 
and many are already working in promising directions. 
Examples include the media literacy work of the 
European Association for Viewers’ Interests (EAVI), 
watchdogs such as AlgorithmWatch, and networks  
of non-profits working on fact-checking and other  
services, such as the Poynter International  
Fact-Checking Network. This is a welcome resource 
for expertise, ideas and practical suggestions that are 
not handicapped by the distrust that often surrounds 
government, EU or Big Tech company efforts. According 
to the 2018 Edelmann Trust Barometer, trust in  
NGOs is higher than that in government or media 
(though still low at only 53% globally).31
But non-profit motives are not the only motives 
for defending against disinformation. Building an 
infrastructure that is resistant to disinformation 
is possible in the private sector too, because 
disinformation is also harmful to business models. 
In other words, in addition to any moral or political 
incentives, there is a commercial motive to fight 
disinformation, with the potential to counteract the 
commercial motive to create it. Private companies 
concerned about their public image have a major 
interest in not being affiliated in any way with deceptive, 
misleading or malicious sites. Many companies are 
concerned about where their ads appear online, and are 
willing to pay extra to ensure they will not be shown on 
inappropriate pages. For example, well-known companies 
such as Kellogg’s, Lego and the Vanguard Group no 
longer advertise on controversial news platforms such 
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as Breitbart or The Daily Mail, and Unilever recently 
announced that they will pull all their advertising  
from Facebook and Google entirely unless they 
can guarantee their ads will not be listed alongside 
undesirable content.32
Online advertising today is mostly automated: rather 
than choosing where they want their ads to appear, 
companies rely on Google AdSense or similar systems 
to provide targeted ads to particular users. This means 
the ads could appear on any site, as long as it has not 
been blacklisted, and the companies in question are 
often unaware of where their ads are being shown. 
Most sites containing pornography or illegal content are 
already on the blacklists, but others – such as fake news 
hosts – must be specifically requested by the advertising 
client if they wish to boycott them.
Some digital advertising agencies and consulting groups 
have carved out a niche for themselves in the marketplace 
by offering services with this social responsibility in mind. 
For example, NetSuccess, a Slovakian online advertising 
and marketing agency, provides their clients with the 
tools to “prevent your brand from being associated 
with controversial content”.33 As disinformation in 
Europe, unlike the US, can be in any of the EU’s 24 
official languages (not to mention regional or minority 
languages), the local expertise of commercial interests 
from all corners of Europe is an excellent resource  
to catch more than just the most widespread  
English-language fake stories.
Perhaps the massive public response to recent social 
media scandals (Facebook’s stock prices fell 16% after 
the Cambridge Analytica revelations and have fallen 
still further since then – see Fig. 2) will help to turn the 
tide of commercial interests when it comes to online 
disinformation. From advertising revenue incentivising 
sensationalism, to services protecting brand images, the 
private sector has enormous power to affect change in 
the digital media sphere. So far, we have mostly seen this 
power used for bad, but its positive potential should not 
be overlooked.
But no single sector can defend against disinformation 
alone, and an effective strategy will need a mutually 
supportive network of all parts of society, where each 
stakeholder plays an appropriate role. This is one reason 
why the national level is inadequate for tackling such 
a widespread problem in the online space: to prevent 
abuses or poor implementation at the national level, and 
to coordinate a wide variety of private sector actors, there 
must be a European level of oversight.
3.4  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION STRATEGY
The EU level is not the highest level on which action 
against disinformation could take place; there is scope 
for further international cooperation, particularly the 
sharing of experience and knowledge between the US and 
Europe. But what the EU does offer is the possibility for 
structured, binding policy, regulatory oversight, and the 
means to enforce it. In fighting a cross-border problem 
such as disinformation, it is the most promising level  
for effective action.
The EU’s efforts have been rather more cautious 
than those of the member states, opting to explore 
more systematic approaches to the issue rather than 
implementing headline-grabbing fines and attacks on  
the platforms. This is partly because the EU seeks to  
avoid infringing on the competences of the member 
states in these areas. But its systematic approach 
also reflects the fact that the EU, with cross-border 
competence, can take a bigger-picture approach with 
more potential for long-term success.
Following the report34 of the High Level Expert Group 
on fake news and online disinformation, Digital 
Commissioner Mariya Gabriel led the establishment  
of a “multi-stakeholder forum on disinformation” to 
facilitate cooperation between actors, eventually resulting 
in the “EU Code of Practice on Disinformation”.35 
The Code sets out a list of commitments and principles 
that the signatories – which include all the main online 
platforms including Facebook, Google and Twitter,  
as well as software designers, advertisers and trade 
associations – agree to follow in their efforts to protect 
users from disinformation.
The Code’s main aim is to improve the transparency, 
trustworthiness and accountability of the online 
ecosystem. For example, it obliges signatories to 
undertake efforts to disrupt the advertising and 
monetarisation incentives to produce disinformation, 
mandating transparency and increased scrutiny of advert 
placements – for example, advertising should be clearly 
distinguished from editorial content on news sites, and 
users should be able to see why they have been targeted 
with particular content. Platforms should also ensure 
that their algorithms prioritise ‘good’ content, according 
to set indicators of trustworthiness – which, however, 
are not defined in any detail. The Code recognises the 
importance of access to data for fact-checkers and 
researchers, and even calls on media outlets to make it 
easier for people to find alternative viewpoints in 
news sources to undermine the attraction of partisan 
fake news. Aware of the risks of censorship, the Code 
explicitly rules out policies encouraging the deletion of 
lawful content “solely on the basis that they are thought 
to be ‘false’”, citing Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom of 
expression and information.36 Each signatory must 
prepare an annual report on its efforts, and the  
European Commission will undertake a review each  
year – indicating that the Code establishes the basis  
for a long-term and adaptive plan.
In this way, the Code demonstrates a laudable awareness 
of the driving factors behind disinformation and the risks 
inherent in regulatory efforts that have been described  
in this paper. It is clearly the result of careful consultation 
with a variety of experts and stakeholders, and  
provides an excellent starting point for a sensitive  
and evidence-based strategy. Its most important work  
lies in long-term measures to “increase societal 
resilience to disinformation” while working on 
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continuous evaluation and further research. This is the 
correct approach: restricting efforts to countering each 
new method of spreading disinformation means treating 
the symptoms and not the cause. It is the long-term 
underlying problem – demand for anti-establishment 
discourse – that must be addressed, with the aim of 
eventually rendering disinformation ineffectual.
There is one major weakness to the Code. It remains 
entirely voluntary, and although all of the relevant 
internet media companies have signed up to it, 
signatories may withdraw at any time. They may 
even withdraw only from individual commitments, 
while technically remaining signatories. This means 
that the success – or otherwise – of the methods 
listed in the Code will depend to a great extent on 
public awareness of its existence and pressure on 
the signatories to uphold their commitments in 
full. The document does conclude with the suggestion 
that “the signatories may indicate on their websites or 
in commercial or other communications that they have 
signed the code” and that they should “take all reasonable 
measures to make their business contacts aware of the 
existence of the Code”.37 But this is not mandatory, and it 
is unclear whether it will form part of the reporting and 
evaluation of the signatories’ efforts.
There is one major weakness to the 
Code. It remains entirely voluntary, and 
although all of the relevant internet media 
companies have signed up to it, signatories 
may withdraw at any time. 
The Code of Practice was followed in December 2018 by 
a comprehensive Joint Action Plan, announced by the 
High Representative and the European Commission. The 
Action Plan’s main purpose is to ensure that the  
Code of Practice is properly implemented in good 
time before the European Parliament elections in 
May 2019, and to complement this with further actions 
on a governmental level. 
It begins with some clarifications of how the Code will 
apply in practice: the European Commission will work 
closely with the online platforms to ensure that they 
comply with their commitments, while simultaneously 
working on supporting media literacy efforts, fact-
checkers and researchers. Platforms must report to 
the Commission once a month – an improvement on 
the yearly timeframe foreseen by the Code. If the Code 
proves to be insufficient, only then will further regulatory 
methods be considered – but this threat remains implicit 
as an incentive for the platforms to cooperate fully.
One important aspect of the fight against disinformation 
that is recognised in the Action Plan is the need to 
increase positive messaging about the EU, given that 
it is frequently a target of disinformation campaigns. 
The Action Plan declares that the Commission and the 
European Parliament will step up their communication 
efforts on Union values and policies. More importantly, 
it recognises that pro-EU communication is more 
effective when it comes from the member states 
rather than the EU institutions themselves. Accordingly, 
it recommends better efforts from member state 
governments to communicate more effectively about 
the EU, particularly its values. This indicates a level of 
awareness that combating disinformation is not merely 
about tweaking algorithms or adjusting advertising 
regulations: it must also involve a campaign to win hearts 
and minds.  
The anti-establishment motive of coordinated 
disinformation means that action taken against it by EU 
bodies runs the risk of further alienating Eurosceptics 
inclined to perceive this as censorship. The Code of 
Practice clearly recognises this, opting to place the 
burden of responsibility for tackling disinformation on 
the private sector and civil society rather than making 
the EU an actor in its own right. The Action Plan, too, 
provides promising ideas in this direction. But its main 
thrust is a considerably increased role for security 
services, an area where caution is needed.
Some ideas are unlikely to be very controversial. For 
example, information-sharing will be facilitated by a 
Rapid Alert System, to be set up by March 2019, which 
will have a contact point in each member state and in 
the EU institutions and will be tasked with helping to 
coordinate responses to malicious disinformation. But 
the Action Plan also foresees a significant funding boost 
for the EU’s existing ‘strategic communications’ efforts, 
including working with the European External Action 
Service to extend anti-disinformation campaigns from 
the Eastern Neighbourhood to the member states. This 
has already started to happen, and has not always had 
promising results.
This means that the success – or  
otherwise – of the methods listed in the 
Code will depend to a great extent on 
public awareness of its existence and 
pressure on the signatories to uphold  
their commitments in full. 
3.5   EU VS DISINFO AND THE EUROPEAN 
EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE
European military intelligence services currently operate 
several institutions and agencies whose main purpose 
is to monitor hostile (chiefly Russian) cyber activity, 
including disinformation, in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
and the EU member states. A Commission communication 
on the topic refers to these as “important elements in 
the cooperation between EU and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) to improve European 
resilience, coordination and preparedness against hybrid 
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interference”.38 One of these is a debunking service by 
the name of ‘EU vs Disinfo’. This platform has faced some 
controversy, for reasons that will be explored below.
EU vs Disinfo sees the fight against 
disinformation as an extension of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy in the 
East; in other words, it is concentrated 
primarily against Russian propaganda 
efforts, especially in Ukraine, and the 
Russian state media’s reporting on the EU. 
But it also tries to address disinformation 
circulating within the EU that repeats 
Kremlin talking points, even  
if unintentionally. 
EU vs Disinfo is run by the European External Action 
Service’s (EEAS) East Stratcom Task Force, and consists 
of a “compilation of cases from the Task Force’s wide 
network of contributors”.39 Many of these contributors 
are NGOs and journalists, but specific information 
about the network’s membership is not available on its 
website. It provides a database of disinformation cases, 
including where the story originated and a brief disproof. 
The service produces a weekly newsletter called ‘Disinfo 
Review’, which summarises recent disinformation stories 
that have been brought to the network’s attention.
The East Stratcom Task Force has the role “to explain and 
promote the European Union’s policies in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood”.40 Accordingly, EU vs Disinfo sees the 
fight against disinformation as an extension of the 
EU’s common foreign and security policy in the East; in 
other words, it is concentrated primarily against Russian 
propaganda efforts, especially in Ukraine, and the Russian 
state media’s reporting on the EU. But it also tries to 
address disinformation circulating within the EU that 
repeats Kremlin talking points, even if unintentionally. 
In doing so, it oversteps its brief. The Task Force has 
no domestic role, but in practice it does comment on 
domestic media. The EEAS is clearly the wrong actor 
for this, not least because it is not accountable in the 
same way the European Commission is. Entrusting 
the policing of the EU’s media and civic space to an EEAS 
platform essentially means that it falls under the brief of 
military intelligence, an elision that should cause as much 
concern as the regulatory worries expressed above. 
This blurring of the boundaries also downplays the role 
of disinformation that is made in Europe, conflating 
Russian (state) propaganda and locally-produced 
material that uses similar messaging. The fact that EU 
vs Disinfo was intended to deal with a specific kind 
of disinformation – pro-Kremlin messaging – and 
now finds itself trying to field the entire European 
media space reveals an imbalance in how the EU 
responds to different kinds of false material. EU vs 
Disinfo’s expansion is symptomatic of the steady growth 
of disinformation from a military intelligence issue in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood to a Europe-wide political 
problem, and while the issue has changed, the actor 
tasked with dealing with it has not.
In theory, this means that the EU has a service that 
can call foul when a European media outlet repeats 
disinformation that can be linked in some way to 
Kremlin propaganda; but where no Russian link can 
be found, it must be silent. In practice, the Task Force’s 
definition of pro-Kremlin messaging is so wide that 
there does not appear to be any systematic approach to 
which stories it covers and which it does not. Much of the 
content on the database appeared in the Russian state 
media, but much did not, including anonymous social 
media material of unknown origin. Most entries relate 
directly to Russia in some way (common subjects in 2018 
were the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal and the 
conflict in Ukraine), but they also cover subjects such as 
migration and integration in Europe. It is true that these 
subjects often appear in Russian messaging about the EU, 
but there is no way of knowing whether any individual 
story has Russian origins or not – especially when its 
coverage includes Russian “talking points” that may also 
be repeated by actors with no link to the Kremlin. The 
service’s entire approach is slapdash and inconsistent, 
which is symptomatic of the enormous (and expanding) 
task it has been given.
What is more, it is not clear who EU vs Disinfo’s intended 
audience is: the punchy site design and brief story 
summaries would suggest the general public, while its 
outreach work seems to be directed towards specialists 
and the defence community. The tone is often derisive 
or dismissive rather than seeking to clarify and explain 
in good faith. If the service’s aim is to address those 
who may have been deceived by disinformation, 
this approach is unlikely to be successful. Rather, 
it may entrench Eurosceptic readers in their views as 
they become frustrated by what they may perceive as 
patronising counter-propaganda.
Many of the narratives described as ‘disinformation’ by EU vs Disinfo 
are closer to partisan spin than outright falsehood. By claiming these 
as fabrications, the platform opens itself to the criticism of spreading 
‘fake news’ itself, as in the Geenstijl case.
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When it crosses into the domestic media, EU vs Disinfo 
finds itself in the position where it must defend its 
choices. In January 2018, the Dutch online media outlet 
Geenstijl commenced court proceedings against EU 
vs Disinfo for its claim that Geenstijl and two other 
Dutch outlets had disseminated disinformation about 
Ukraine. The claim originated from a mistranslation, and 
Geenstijl’s lawyers maintained that the articles contained 
only legitimate criticism of the Ukrainian government. 
EU vs Disinfo eventually retracted the claims, but in the 
meantime the Dutch parliament debated the case and 
passed a motion calling for EU vs Disinfo to be shut down, 
citing concern for its impact on freedom of speech and 
the lack of accountability for its claims.41
The tone is often derisive or dismissive 
rather than seeking to clarify and explain 
in good faith. If the service’s aim is to 
address those who may have been deceived 
by disinformation, this approach is 
unlikely to be successful. Rather, it may 
entrench Eurosceptic readers in their  
views as they become frustrated by  
what they may perceive as patronising 
counter-propaganda.
The service’s defenders cite the fact that, when the 
claims against the Dutch outlets were first published, 
EU vs Disinfo had a very small staff and budget, 
meaning that mistakes were inevitable. The solution, 
in their eyes, is to provide the platform with better 
resources, as foreseen by the Action Plan. This attitude 
does not take the problem seriously enough; when 
passing judgement on European news outlets, the 
EU simply cannot afford to get things wrong. The 
court case and parliament motion were a PR disaster, not 
least because the headline “EU anti-fake news service 
spreads fake news” proved irresistible to the media, 
mainstream and alternative alike. This demonstrates 
the particular vulnerability of the EU in the fight 
against disinformation: it depends on trust, which is in 
increasingly short supply.
EU vs Disinfo’s greatest failing is its title. Especially given 
its origins as a tool of ‘strategic communications’ and 
its errors in the past, the name does little to promote 
the image of a fair and neutral arbiter of the truth: 
if anything, whether for invalid or valid reasons, it 
invites accusations of propaganda. It also does not fit 
into the initial European Commission strategy, which 
recommended limiting the EU’s role as an actor in its 
own right. Combined with the lack of transparency 
regarding the composition of the network and the direct 
link to an agency whose purpose is to promote the EU 
(East Stratcom), the result is a service that can do 
little to persuade sceptics that it is a reliable and 
neutral source of information. However well-respected 
its role in fighting Russian propaganda in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood, EU vs Disinfo in its current form may be 
a liability in the fight against domestic disinformation. 
The recent scandal in the UK regarding the Integrity 
Initiative, an anti-disinformation charity that declared 
itself to be independent but was revealed to be funded 
by the British government, demonstrates the impact 
on public trust when a tool that seeks to fight against 
disinformation opens itself to conspiracy theories or 
accusations of hypocrisy.42
Given the role that Russian information warfare has 
played in seeking to influence elections across the 
West, it is understandable that the EU wishes to boost 
its defences. But when it comes to the European 
domestic space, a prominent role for the EEAS and 
state security services may be counter-productive, 
playing into narratives of censorship and a culture 
war between ‘the establishment’ and ‘the people’. 
Certainly, the expertise and experience of East Stratcom 
in fighting propaganda in the Eastern Neighbourhood  
can be useful for domestic bodies, but European and 
national decision-makers should consider very carefully 
whether they are really the best tools in such a sensitive 
political environment. 
Disinformation is best understood not as a security 
issue, but as a tool; it may be used by any actor, and 
resisting it effectively means not merely neutralising 
the actor, but building defences against the 
technique. There is a place for security services in  
the fight against disinformation, but it must work in 
harmony with the soft-touch comprehensive approach 
outlined in the Code of Practice.
Disinformation is best understood not  
as a security issue, but as a tool; it may 
be used by any actor, and resisting it 
effectively means not merely neutralising 
the actor, but building defences against  
the technique. 
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4. Recommendations
4.1  THE EU AND MEMBER STATES
As it is the highest level at which effective policy can be 
implemented and enforced, the EU remains the most 
promising level for action against disinformation: it 
is best placed to combat a cross-border phenomenon 
without the pressures of day-to-day national politics.  
In general terms, the Code of Practice and the civil 
society/private sector aspects of the Action Plan 
should be the priority: they err on the side of inaction,  
but this is preferable to clumsy or inappropriate action. 
There is a very real danger of making things worse. 
Ultimately, the only truly effective way to fight 
disinformation will be to address the crisis of confidence 
in mainstream politics that is creating demand for 
alternative narratives, and this should be the first 
priority of any actor. In the meantime, however, the 
focus of EU efforts should be to develop a supportive 
environment in which NGOs, civil society, the 
media and the wider private sector can construct 
the societal infrastructure needed to resist 
disinformation.
q  The Code of Practice is an excellent starting point, 
and it should remain at the heart of the European 
response to disinformation. Its voluntary nature 
is a weakness, but compulsion would likely be 
counter-productive. To keep the signatories bound 
to their commitments, the European Commission 
must therefore keep the option of regulation on the 
table as an incentive. There must be consequences 
if signatories choose to withdraw from the Code 
or specific commitments – the threat of regulatory 
measures that could be harmful to business practices 
should serve to keep the signatories committed  
to cooperation.
q  Since it is implemented on a purely voluntary basis, 
the Code of Practice must be widely advertised 
so that the public is aware of it and can hold 
signatories to account. The Commission should insist 
that the reports, which signatories should submit 
each month, include details on their efforts to spread 
awareness among their users about the Code and what 
they are doing to meet their commitments. These 
reports should be made public, and the Commission 
should issue a regular public evaluation of how each 
signatory is doing, including recommendations of 
where improvements could be made.
q  Fighting disinformation in Europe should take 
place in the civil space to ensure that actors are 
democratically accountable. There is a role for 
military strategic communications in countering state 
actor interference, but excessive concern over the 
influence of ‘Russian bots’ in European democracy 
risks neglecting the very real home-grown threat from 
populists, trolls and the far-right. The European public 
space must be reclaimed by the European public, 
not by the EEAS or state security services, and 
allowing the fight against disinformation to be framed 
as a national or European security matter rather than 
a domestic challenge will only contribute to further 
alienating a sceptical public. This is why the Code  
of Practice, with its focus on civil society and  
the private sector, should take priority over security 
sector actions.
q  The policy expert consensus is that EU vs Disinfo 
provides a valuable service in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood; but to avoid playing into conspiracy 
theories or hostile narratives its role within the 
EU member states should be reconsidered. As a 
platform that casts judgement on whether something 
is true or false, it is potentially vulnerable to these 
criticisms and should tread carefully. Either it should 
be moved from the EEAS to the Commission (or better 
still, to an independent body not directly affiliated 
with political interests) and tasked with a specifically 
domestic brief, or it should restrict its operations to 
analysing Russian state media and propaganda in 
Ukraine and other Eastern Neighbourhood countries. 
In any case, it should be rebranded to remove the 
reference to the EU in its name, and if it seeks to 
convince as well as document then it should  
consider using more detailed disproofs and a more 
professional tone.
q  The European Commission should expand its 
horizon beyond the hosts and distributors of 
online disinformation, and look into what it can 
do to support not only NGOs but also private 
sector actors with an interest in maintaining high 
informational standards in public life, as these  
have may have access to specialist knowledge and  
resources out of the reach of governmental actors. A 
European-wide advertising blacklist of suspicious 
sites, updated regularly with input from consultants 
or advertising agencies across the continent, would 
be an excellent start to cutting off the revenue stream 
that makes disinformation profitable.
q  If national governments seek to legislate against 
disinformation, such as by expanding hate 
speech laws, they must tread carefully. It should 
ultimately be up to the courts to decide what 
is disinformation and what is not, not private 
companies or politicians. It is true that legal 
prosecution is too slow to be effective in preventing 
content from reaching large numbers of viewers. 
But the response should not be to use this argument 
to justify clamping down on media freedom, but 
rather to recognise the limits of legislating against 
disinformation and invest efforts elsewhere.
q  The EU must ensure that it does not overlook or 
permit threats to media freedom implemented 
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in the member states in the name of fighting 
disinformation. The work of the Commission should 
be to find an approach that all of Europe can sign 
up to, and it should include monitoring member 
state initiatives and crying foul where necessary, 
particularly when they cross the line into censorship. 
q  Constant research and evaluation will be an important 
part of any strategy. The work of the High Level Expert 
Group was supplemented by a Eurobarometer survey 
on fake news and public trust in the media. More 
regular opinion polling on the subject – perhaps 
as part of the regular biannual Eurobarometers – 
would provide a useful data source which might help 
researchers to track the impact of trialled methods. 
This would provide not only snapshots but a better 
vision of change and development over time. This 
would be particularly useful for shaping the messaging 
of any public awareness campaign focused on media 
literacy (see section 4.3 below). 
q  The Action Plan rightly recognises that “pro-active 
and objective communication on Union values 
and policies is particularly effective when carried 
out directly by member states”.43 To counteract 
the rising force of Eurosceptic messaging, member 
state governments should make serious efforts to 
involve citizens more closely in European politics 
and decision-making. The European Citizens’ 
Consultations are an example of good practice in this 
field, and they should be repeated and built upon as 
described in EPC’s Evaluation Report.44
4.2   THE SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS  
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Putting responsibility on tech companies to curate 
and control what is posted on their platforms will 
only increase the influence they have over users’ lives. 
It could also have a greater chilling effect than state 
regulation and is unfair on smaller platforms that 
will be disproportionately affected by the burden of 
responsibility. But at the same time, these social media 
companies hold the keys to the bulk of internet users’ 
exposure to media content, including disinformation. 
If they are serious about their efforts to resist 
disinformation – and they should be – there are several 
things they can do to effectively collaborate with the EU 
and other stakeholders:
q  In the interest of social responsibility, social media 
platforms should guard their algorithms and 
research data less jealously. This data, currently 
only available to in-house analysis, could be 
transformative for experts and researchers if it were 
available more widely, as it would provide a huge 
amount of information on which to base policy or 
research. It would surely result in a ‘boom’ in scientific 
knowledge of how content spreads online and how 
political views are shaped by media exposure.
q  If the platforms are not willing to share research data 
on a voluntary basis, the European Commission 
should consider legislation to mandate open 
access to data. This would be strongly resisted by 
tech companies, who consider these to be business 
secrets. But given the central role they play in the 
media and information space today, it is unacceptable 
that these companies can sit on huge amounts of 
potentially revolutionary information and not release 
it for public research. This may involve a seismic 
shift in the sector’s business model, given that their 
algorithms would become public domain, but there 
are likely many in the sector who already suspect that 
the current level of secrecy is unsustainable due to 
increasing public and governmental scrutiny. There 
is a strong case for readdressing the balance between 
tech giants and their users – whose data provides their 
profits – with a new ‘social contract’.45 This could be 
implemented in cooperation with the US, where the 
majority of tech giants are based, to the benefit of all 
social media users worldwide.
q  Online platforms must be sensitive to the needs of 
local media ecosystems when experimenting with 
new features or anti-disinformation tools. It is vital 
that they do not cause harm to genuine, high-quality 
news content in their efforts to reduce disinformation, 
as has happened as a result of previous experiments. 
Any changes to the user experience should be made 
in consultation with independent media outlets, 
NGOs and experts, and preferably also with the input 
of other stakeholders in the framework of meetings 
between the Commission and the signatories to the 
Code of Practice.
q  In particular, given that the European Commission 
is working on a holistic Europe-wide strategy, the 
platforms should refrain from trialling new features 
only in individual markets. Instead, their changes 
should apply simultaneously in all EU member states, 
so that all European citizens have the same online 
experience. This will simplify efforts to combat 
disinformation in Europe by eliminating unnecessary 
variation between countries. If the platforms wish 
to experiment with new features, they should find 
other means to do so, such as by taking a random 
selection of users across the whole of Europe. This will 
minimise any potential negative effects on local  
news ecosystems.
q  Mainstream news media, meanwhile, should consider 
their responsibility to be fair and not unduly 
partisan. Competing alongside social media content 
and disinformation puts traditional media under 
enormous financial pressure, but they should ensure 
their credibility is not compromised in the process of 
adapting to online markets. They should consider that 
there remains a healthy market for news content that 
is reliable, and that having a well-regarded pedigree 
as a print or broadcast outlet gives them a valuable 
edge over online-only competitors. Pluralism in the 
media environment means not only pluralism in 
ideological positions and in news formats, but also 
pluralism in tone: clickbait may be a successful 
way of drawing in casual readers, but there remains 
a market share for more serious, respectable, and 
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high register content, which is still perceived as more 
trustworthy. Not all media outlets need to follow the 
fashions set by the internet age.
4.3  MEDIA CONSUMERS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
In the meantime, it may be that disinformation is here to 
stay and is simply part of how media is consumed in the 
information age. The methods described in this paper may 
help to reduce its reach and volume, but so long as the 
internet remains open to all (as it should), there  
will be malicious material lurking where it cannot be  
easily opposed. 
Respondents to a Eurobarometer poll on the subject 
considered journalists to be the actors with the most 
responsibility to stop disinformation, followed by 
national authorities.46 But they also placed a great deal 
of responsibility on the citizens themselves. That is, the 
public largely recognises its responsibility to exercise 
judgement about what it reads. But the citizens must not 
be alone in this. 
q  The only truly dependable strategy to counter ‘fake 
news’ will be to change the way we as media 
consumers read the news: by raising awareness 
of the importance of checking and comparing 
sources, applying scepticism to outrageous claims, 
and exercising informed judgement at all times, 
disinformation can be reduced from a dangerous 
political problem to just part of the background noise 
of our online experiences. Better media literacy can 
help more people to learn how to recognise the most 
common disinformation techniques.
q  The European Commission’s focus on media literacy 
and education reflects an understanding that 
investing in this field will have enormous pay-offs in 
terms of societal resilience to disinformation. A media 
literacy campaign could be led by the EU, national 
governments, or the NGO sector. Even the tech giants 
may wish to contribute funds as part of their public 
relations work.
q  To be effective, media literacy efforts should target 
the most vulnerable groups as a priority. The task is 
to help those who are not already ‘digital natives’ to 
approach online content with the appropriate tools 
to tell fact from fiction. That means not restricting 
educational efforts to schools, but running a wider 
public awareness campaign designed specifically 
to target older generations, who are more likely to 
share fake news.47 
q  Ultimately the only thing likely to shift commercial 
practice is public opinion and the behaviour of their 
customers. This is difficult when it comes to social 
media and online news, since for the most part users 
‘pay’ not with money but with attention. But in this 
field, attention is money – and if European citizens are 
unsatisfied with the efforts of a particular platform or 
outlet, they must express it by choosing where to 
invest their attention. It may seem that social media 
is a monopoly of a handful of big players, but where 
there is demand, alternatives are always available. Users 
should not feel that they have no choice but to accept 
whatever conditions prevail on their platform of choice.
The keyword is responsibility. The platforms that host 
news content; the governments that set the regulations; 
the readers that consume news: all these have a 
responsibility to ensure that European democracy is 
not threatened by disinformation’s distortion of public 
opinion, nor by heavy-handed responses that threaten 
freedom of expression.
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Conclusion: Safeguarding truth for the future
While some motives driving the spread of disinformation, 
just as the monetary incentive posed by advertising 
methods, are relatively simple to counteract, the demand 
for anti-establishment messaging created by a crisis of 
mainstream liberal democracy is a symptom of a much 
more worrying structural cause. It also means that any 
attempt to fight back against the disinformation problem 
must be very careful not to exacerbate the Eurosceptic 
and populist views that have enabled it in the first place. 
Existing measures, such as legislation with a chilling 
effect or EU bodies with poorly-defined roles, run exactly 
this risk.
If self-regulation puts too much power  
in the hands of tech giants, and state 
efforts encourage the very thing they  
are intended to fight against, more 
promising potential can be found among 
other stakeholders.
If self-regulation puts too much power in the hands of 
tech giants, and state efforts encourage the very thing 
they are intended to fight against, more promising 
potential can be found among other stakeholders.  
In particular, the possibility of private sector actors  
such as consultancies and advertising agencies  
bringing their unique expertise to the fight against 
disinformation has been overlooked by most 
commentators, despite some companies already  
working in this sector. NGOs, too, have more  
to contribute. 
No single measure will be enough to counteract such a 
wide-ranging phenomenon, however. If society as a whole 
is to be made more resilient to disinformation, the best 
way of achieving this will involve sensitive cooperation 
between all these stakeholders, who should be brought 
together in a multi-stakeholder forum convened by the 
European Commission. It may be necessary for some 
actors, notably the social media platforms, to abandon 
commercial principles that have served them well in 
the past but are now facing public opposition. They 
should see this not as a surrender, but an investment in a 
sustainable future for their business model.
The media’s principal role in a democracy is to create 
informed, empowered and engaged citizens who can 
participate in the democratic system on the basis of 
reliable and complete information. If we can render 
disinformation negligible and ineffectual, by way of 
multifaceted changes to regulation, greater private sector 
responsibility and increased media literacy, the internet 
will remain a potent and beneficial tool in shaping the 
resilient media and active citizenship that lie at the heart 
of a healthy democracy.
It may be necessary for some actors, 
notably the social media platforms, to 
abandon commercial principles that have 
served them well in the past but are now 
facing public opposition. They should  
see this not as a surrender, but an 
investment in a sustainable future for  
their business model.
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